This paper presents the Coloured Petri Net modeling for security analysis of the Extended Role Based Access Control systems.
Introduction
Formal methods help the development of secure systems by reducing ambiguities in security policy specifications and providing mathematical verification tools. By the formal verification, it is possible to confirm security related properties hold in a system.
In this paper, we propose an interpretation of Coloured Petri Net(CPN) [1] , [2] with security considerations for the formal specification of the Extended Role Based Access Control(E-RBAC). Petri Net(PN) has been widely used to model concurrent and asynchronous systems. CPN is a high level PN introducing type manipulation so that it describes a system and properties compactly. CPN is an efficient method to model the multi-user system in which the E-RBAC policy is enforced.
Backgrounds

The Extended Role Based Access Control (E-RBAC)
E-RBAC limits accesses based on continuous access control information more than instant access information. Procedural constraints(PC) * was introduced to apply the concept of continuous information to the traditional Role Based Access Control(RBAC).
PC is the partially ordered sets of behaviors, and a behavior is defined as the set of permissions. A PC unit has a property which is represented by a positive or a negative value. A positive PC unit describes a strict execution order of permissions. A negative PC unit represents a harmful execution. Fig. 1 shows the examples of the positive and negative PCs [3] . The positive PC example indicates that a) E-mail: sunihill@gist.ac.kr the account related operations should be executed along the defined sequence. The negative PC explains that the repetitive trial of linking/unlinking to the temporary file threats the system. Therefore the repetition should be prohibited. Considering the procedural information as well as the traditional access matrix information, an access control system approves executions of operations more rigidly against various system attacks. Namely, any execution of an operation will be denied if it corresponds to the case of the negative PC, or if it is performed against the execution steps which are defined in positive PC.
As a result, the system which enforces the E-RBAC prevents various known-attacks by maintaining the lists of dangerous execution sequences as well as it keeps the principles of least privilege and separation of duties(SOD) by controlling permitted executions with an order [3] .
On the other hand, we need to find an appropriate formal model of the E-RBAC for the clear specification and the verification of security-related properties. Formal models of access control can be classified into the access control models and information flow models [6] . Traditionally, the RBAC has been specified mostly with access control models such as set notations or formal languages like Z [4] . However, the specification methods are not appropriate to adopt the constraints of the E-RBAC. Although those meth- * The term of "procedural constraints" in this paper has the same meaning with "procedural restriction" of the reference [3] . Although Procedural Constraint(PC) is one of the components of Procedural Restrictions(PR) in E-RBAC, PC is the core and has required properties for the execution sequence control. We only used the term of PC here to avoid confusion that causes from different terms.
ods have been enough to specify access conditions of the RBAC, it is difficult to describe the procedural constraints with them.
Rather than using the traditional access control modeling approaches, it is better to describe the procedural properties using the state-transition based formalism. The statetransition based approaches have been used in the field of information analysis, and they provide easy and intuitive structures for describing procedural properties.
CPN Models
CPN is not only an efficient state-transition model for concurrent and asynchronous systems; It also represents concisely multi-user, multi-process systems in which the E-RBAC is enforced. We adopt the CPN formalism for the E-RBAC specification.
PN has been already applied for information flow analysis. Varadharajan [7] proposed a PN model for information flow models and Juszczyszyn [8] suggested SCPN by extending the PN model with CPN. However, those formal models are not suitable for the E-RBAC modeling yet. The information flow models interpret tokens, places, and transitions of the PN as objects, channels, subjects, respectively. The firing sequence of the PN models the flow of information. To model PCs of the E-RBAC, we should arrange objects and define their relationships. However, it is impossible since objects are represented by tokens in the information flow models. Moreover, the models have no scheme to describe traditional access control information. The information flow models are established on fundamentally different concepts and objectives from the access control models.
Constrained Coloured Petri Net
Basic Concepts
We extended CPN components and translated each of them into the elements of the E-RBAC. In the proposed Constrained Coloured Petri Net(CCPN), tokens, places, and transitions are interpreted as subjects, objects, and Access Enforcement Functions(AEF) [5] , respectively.
A subject is represented by a token which itinerates a net as the subject accesses objects. An access of the subject to an object is a movement of a token from one place to the next place. To move to the next place, the token must be enabled and fired at the transition which is located between the current and the next places. When the token is being fired, the access conditions are checked at the pre-place, the transition, and the post-place based on the traditional access matrix information. That is, the subject should have authorized roles, and the access should not be against the principle of SODs. Fig. 2 shows the basic structure of the CCPN model.
On the other side, PC is represented as a subnet. An operation execution sequence is represented as the arranged places. The token itinerates along the places under PC. A negative PC leads unauthorized accesses to an isolated state, and prohibits further accesses. In addition, a positive PC forces accesses to be occurred in predefined order. As a result, CCPN expresses the sequence of accesses relying on a state-transition structure, as well as access conditions of access matrix model.
Definitions
Definition 1 (Constrained CPN, CCPN): CCPN = Σ, P, T, A, N, C, G, E, I, X
• Color set Σ = {Uid, Sid, Oid, Mode, Op, Roles, R tok, R p, Auth, Token, SSOD, DSOD} -color Uid, Sid, Oid = integer; Identifier of users, sessions, objects, respectively. -color Mode = {m 1 , ..., m n }; Access modes. -color Op = Oid×Mode; Defined operations on objects.
-color Roles = {r 1 , ..., r m }; -color R tok, R p = 2 Roles ; Roles of tokens and places, respectively. -color Auth = "authorized" | "unauthorized"; -color Token = tuple of Uid, S id, R tok, R p, Op, Auth ; Tokens represent access subjects. -color DSOD, SSOD = Roles×Roles; Dynamic and static SOD relationships.
• P is a finite set of places; Places represent access objects. If tokens are on a place then accesses are occurred between the subject and the objects.
• T is a finite set of transitions; A transition can be interpreted as the access enforcement functions (AEF [5] ) which test subjects' authorities by evaluating arc expressions.
• A is a finite set of arcs such that P A = T A = P T = φ; • N is a node function defined from A → P × T T × P; • C is a colour function defined from P → Σ such that ∀ p ∈ P, C(p) = Token; • G is a guard function defined from T into expressions such that ∀ t ∈ T: [Type(G(t)) = Boolean ∧ Type(Var(G(t))) ⊆ Σ] (where Type() and Var() return types and variables of arguments, respectively); The expressions in guard functions direct particular operations of a system. • I is an initialization function defined from P into closed expressions such that ∀ p ∈ P: [Type(I(p)) = C(p) MS ] • X is access matrix information; The entry of X is the tuple of r, S L, OL (where r ∈ Roles, SL ⊆ Uid, and OL ⊆ Op). Semantically, SL includes the authorized users for the role, r. By acquiring r, subjects can access the operations which are included in OL.
• E is an arc expression function defined from A into expressions such that ∀ a ∈ A: Where sec rcv, sec trans, sec snd are defined for each transition t ∈ as follows:
• sec rcv is T RUE iff for all Finally, we can define security of a system by following steps.
• secure transition: for all reachable markings, if the value of auth field of the emitted token is "authorized," the transition can fire safely. Subjects can access objects with relevant roles by the transition.
• secure marking: if the values of auth field of all tokens of markings are all "authorized," the marking is secure.
• secure net: if all transition in a net is secure, the all reachable marking is secure, and the net is secure.
• secure system: we can consititute a corresponding net with a system. If the net is secure, we can say the system is secure.
Discussion and Specification Examples
It is noteworthy that CCPN model is different from information flow models such as SCPN. SCPN focused on where does the information flows, while CCPN access control model aims at judging permitted or not permitted actions of subjects. If there is one subject, SCPN presents a similar topology to the net of CCPN without PC ( Fig. 3(a) ). However, if there is another subject which has different label, we need to expand the SCPN topology to model the additional subject by adding the corresponding transition. In case of CCPN, the topology is unchanged because the subjects are represented by colored tokens. The topology of CCPN is only expanded when PCs are added. The objectives and the generated nets of CCPN is totally different from those of SCPN in the aspect of semantics and structures of nets. The proposed model is also different from the previous RBAC specifications. CCPN has adopted a state-transition approach and still has traditional access control information. It is a kind of hybrid specification which is distinguished from the previous access control models.
The auth field in CCPN is defined for the security evaluation. By checking its value during the verification process with the state-space generation, we can test the security of each transition, and eventually can evaluate the security of a system. On the other hand, we can associate the value with the firability condition of a transition. In that case, the liveness property is closely related to the security because the firability of transitions depends on role assignments. Thus, we can verify the correctness of the role assignments by checking liveness of each transition in PCs. We can test the effectiveness of behavioral restrictions by checking reachability also. Occurrence graph can be generated and analyzed for the confirmation [1] , [2] , and automatic tools are provided for simulations as in the case of CPN Tools [9] . Fig. 3 shows an example of CCPN including two example PCs of Fig. 1 . In case of usual accesses without PC (Fig. 3(a) ), securely enabled tokens are fired, and return to the ready place. On the other hand, accesses under behavioral restrictions are checked while tokens itinerate the subnets (Figs. 3(b),(c) ). The itinerary is initiated by guard func-tions of transitions.
Examples of Procedural Constraints
By the property of PC, subnet constraints are categorized to one of two types: positive and negative. Under positive PC, tokens execute operations according to the topologically given order. The execution occurs exactly as the transitions are arranged. For example, after add bal operation, no operations can be occurred except log bal. It is based on the structure of the subnet which constitutes the positive PC. In the subnet, the places should have only output arcs which lead to the defined next accesses (Fig. 3(b) ).
By negative PC, it is available to detect clever attacks which might hide the attack signatures by placing attack operations between normal executions. Moreover, if the access of the token is recognized as a dangerous one, the corresponding accesses are terminated. The response to the dangerous accesses is also made based on the structure of the subnet which presents the negative PC. The places should be arranged along the dangerous execution sequence, and filnally it results in an isolated state or a termination transition ( Fig. 3(c) ).
CPN can express logic structures like programming languages [1] . It is reasonable to express behavioral restrictions as subnets. Also, we can adopt previous CPN modeling results of attack signatures [10] for IDSs.
Conclusion
We proposed an interpretation and an extension of CPN to model the extended RBAC system with PC. CCPN specifies the execution flow as well as it includes the traditional concept of the access matrix. CCPN is distinguished from the traditional information flow models or access matrix models.
We will expand our model to describe the session establishment, role hierarchy, and role administration later. Also, we will introduce the hierarchical CCPN construction, and the properties of CCPN related with the hierarchical CPN construction in future work.
